The considerations underlying the formulation of US trade policy have been subject to detailed study in the literature (see the study by Baldwin, 1985 , and the survey by Hillman, 1989 ). There has on the other hand been little scrutiny of protectionist practices in the European Community (EC). The most prominent Instrument of EC protectionism is the application of antidumping laws (AD): Tharakan (1988) and Messerlin (1987 Messerlin ( , 1989 ) provide studies of the sector/country incidence of antidumping applications and the protectionist impact. This paper adopts an endogenous trade policy vantage to investigate the motives underlying EC applications of antidumping laws. We study whether antidumping actions in the EC reflect political discretion or technical determination.
Our empirical results indicate that EC antidumping measures, although subject to technical determination de jure, are de facto politically determined. This contrasts with US practice, as described by Finger, Hall, and Nelson (1982) , where the application of antidumping measures is subject to technical determination. The differences between the US and EC applications of antidumping law derives from the institutional structures governing the determination of whether dumping has -2occurred, and not from different definitions of what constitutes dumping.
In the literature, the classical view of dumping is associated with international price discrimination by a firm with domestic monopoly power (Viner, 1923 , Haberler, 1936 .
Predatory motives have also been imputed. More recent studies of dumping have considered circumstances where exports are priced below marginal cost, and have demonstrated how dumping can be the consequence of imperfect adjustment to changed factor demand (Ethier, 1982) and domestic uncertainty in either supply or demand (Hillman and Katz, 1986) . There is a view of antidumping laws as facilitating regulation of firms resident in different national jurisdictions (Hillman, 1990) . The laws provide floors below which foreign competititors are legally constrained from decreasing their price, thereby, facilitating a Bertrand eguilibrium that sustains increased profits.
The GATT dumping code does not relate to marginal cost, but defines dumping as sales below the "füll" per unit cost of production, plus a "reasonable" profit margin. The notions of "füll" and "reasonable" are not well specified, and leave considerable scope for discretion in interpretation of whether in a particular instance dumping has occurred. The institutional structure governing the determination of dumping within the national trade laws is therefore of prime importance. At issue is who exercises discretion in interpretation, and in accord with which objectives, political or objectively specified economic criteria.
-3 -Our study of the application of European antidumping law supports the conclusion of a prominent role for political discretion in determining whether protection is to be provided.^ US dumping determination rests more on technical criteria, while escape-clause actions are politically determined (Finger, Hall, and Nelson, 1982) . Our results indicate that in the European case dumping determinations have a similar role to escape-clause actions in the US. In the EC, application of the antidumping laws is indicated by our study to be part of the broader spectrum of politically determined endogenous protection.
The EC's use of antidumping actions has been an effective instrument inhibiting Import competition. Some 300 antidumping cases were initiated by EC complainants in the 1980-1987 period.
The average increase in the domestic price of imports as a conseguence of antidumping complaints was in the neighborhood of 23 percent, with increases ranging above 50 percent. This contrasts with the EC's average tariff on manufactured goods of seven percent. Within five years after Initiation of an AD investigation, imports of the impacted product on average feil by approximately 50 percent. In 1985, beginning from seven percent, an increasing proportion of the EC's total trade has been subject to antidumping actions (Messerlin, 1987) .
Our empirical results have implications for post-1992 EC trade policy. If protectionist interests demand compensation for the abolition of national protectionist barriers after 1992,^ interest groups have the scope offered by EC AD measures, since such measures are subject to political discretion rather than technical rules. AD measures can theref ore be a pinnacle of "Fortress Europe".
The paper proceeds as follows. The institutional basis is set out in section II for the US and section III for the EC.
Section IV specifies hypotheses concerning the EC AD practice and reports the empirical studies. Section V places AD in the context of broader EC trade policy determination.
II. The US Institutional Setting
Trade policy measures subject to national trade laws can be subject to motives of political influence. However, limited scope for bureaucratic discretion and limited political accountability constrain the political context of the US AD policy.^ Figure 1 illustrates the four phases of the US-procedure: application, investigation, decision, and appeal. Procedural discretion of the administration is small: applications that fulfill certain requirements with respect to formality and contents automatically lead to investigations. The procedural rules of the investigation relating to the time frame and the rights of parties involved are clearly defined. The conditions warranting the imposition of preliminary duties, enforcement, and prevention of circumvention, are unambiguous.
In the investigation, the existence of both dumping and injury has to be proven in order to evoke an antidumping measure.^ Dumping and injury are investigated separately by the International Trade Administration (ITA) and the International -5 -Trade Commission (ITC), respectively. The rules determining the determination of dumping are stringent. Dumping exists when the "normal value" of a product is higher than its export price, "normal value" being defined as either the price of the product in the exporter's home market, the price in a third market, or the füll production cost plus a profit margin.
The difference between normal value and export price -the dumping margindetermines the AD duty. The criteria for the finding of injury are more vague and contain indicators such as market share, capacity usage, etc..
Two factors further decrease bureaucratic discretion. The protective order system allows parties involved to inspect each other's files, thereby preventing collusion between the administration and one of the parties. The exporters, for example, can review the material on which the injury Claim is based. Secondly, parties involved can appeal the decision and the courts can examine the decision of the administration and the use or abuse of its discretion. Both institutions increase the incentive of officials to conduct investigations
impartially.
An affirmative determination of both dumping and injury has to result in an AD measure. There is, however, Wide discretion regarding whether to impose a duty, or to seek an "undertaking" of a voluntary price increase by the exporter. The EC AD process differs significantly from that of the US. In the EC, there is more scope for administrative discretion, and political accountability of the investigators is 7 greater.
The EC process constitutes five phases as set out in figure   2 : application, preselection, investigation, decision, and appeal. Applications by interest groups are forwarded to the Commission (the EC's administration). The Commission has discretion to reject an application or initiate an investigation at the stage of preselection. First, the Commission selects those applications that fulfill the formal criteria. It then consults the Council's advisory committee (the Council being the forum of member governments and operating as the EC legislature) Q in deciding which applications are to lead to an investigation. The investigation is conducted by the Commission.
Procedural rules provide some discretion with respect to time frame, imposition of temporary duties and prevention of circumvention. The rights of the parties involved are well defined.
The rules for the determination of dumping are similar to those of the US. Only since 1984 have formal criteria for injury determination been applied: changes in market share, capacity utilization, employment, profits, etc.^ These criteria are -7vaguely formulated and give the Commission significant discretion in the determination of injury.
Two missing factors of control increase the Commission's discretion relative to political discretion in the US procedure.
The investigation is less transparent and verifiable than in the US, because of the lack of a protective order system. Also, in the EC system, there is only limited recourse to the courts for appeal. Parties can appeal on a procedural basis. The European Court of Justice, however, cannot overturn a decision if a party believes that bureaucratic discretion has been abused.
In addition, the Commission is obliged to consider whether an affirmative decision is in the 'public' interest, in terms of whether users and consumers are disproportionately adversely affected by antidumping duties. It is not bound by any specific rules to evaluate the 'public' interest and never chose to reject an antidumping duty on the basis of disadvantage to users and consumers in the eighties.
The Commission has significant discretion with respect to the means whereby the price of competititive imports is increased, via an undertaking to increase price, or via the levying of a duty. The level of duties or undertakings can be set up to the value of the determined dumping margin but can be less. This discretion does not exist in the US where the measure imposed must be equal to the dumping margin.
At the decision stage, affirmative results of the investigation do not automatically lead to an AD measure. The
Council has a right to reject the Commission's findings with a 54/76 majority. Table 1 indicates the comparatively high degree of discretion of the EC's decision makers.
-8 -With regard to political accountability, EC bureaucrats are subject to political scrutiny. Politicians can interfere through the Council at the two decisive stages of an AD procedure (see figure 2). They can block or promote the initiation of an investigation in the preselection phase and the Commission can be pressured to use its discretion in the investigation in accord with political objectives, because the Council can if it so wishes, reject the Commission's findings. The Council has the right to nominate the heads of the Commission (Commissioners) .
It determines the latters 1 salaries, reappointments, and future careers in national politics. The Council can request changes in the regulation implementing the GATT antidumping code. In 1984 for instance, formal rules for the injury determination were introduced.
EC antidumping can, therefore, be politically determined by political Intervention at various levels of the decision-making process.
IV. An Empirical Investigation of the EC Antidumping Process

A. Hypotheses
This section reports on empirical tests of the political discretion versus technical/economic determination alternatives for the motives underlying EC antidumping decisions. Finger et al. (1982) test the choice between rejection and acceptance for the US and conclude that US AD is technically determined. We conduct an analogous test for the EC. In addition, we investigate the choice between duties and undertakings and the -9determinants of the level of AD protection. In particular we test three hypotheses: 10 1) The choice between acceptance and rejection is influenced politically, the impact of rules being non-negligible, though.
The respective test is referred to as A/R-test.
2) The choice between "undertaking" and duty is determined politically ("INSTR-test"). More specifically, we test the hypothesis that undertakings reflect the collusive equilibrium, 1 1 where firms agree to forgo price competition. J -
3) The actual level of protection is determined politically ("LEVEL-test"). While the upper bound of protection is determined by the dumping/injury margin, we hypothesize that reductions are granted for political reasons. Table 2 surveys the tests at the various levels of decision making.
B. Description of Exogenous Variables
The set of exogenous variables has been chosen to reflect both political and technical/economic influence as predetermined by our hypotheses. The political variables used are to represent both domestic/EC and international pressure; the administrative variables reflect the main criteria that are supposed to determine the AD process, i.e. injury and dumping. A detailed description of the independent variables is given below and surveyed in the Appendix.
B.l. Variables measuring political influences:
At the international level. the threat of retaliation is expected to result in free trade lobbying. Therefore, countries absorbing large amounts of EC exports should be confronted with -10less trade barriers. The respective variable EXPORTS contains the EC export value per country^. its coefficient is expected to have a negative sign in the A/R-test.
As those interested in a rejection or acceptance will lobby for a reduction or a duty equalling the dumping margin respectively, the coefficients of EXPORTS as well as all other variables are expected to have the same sign for the LEVEL-test as for the A/R-test. intensity, which is used as a proxy for the existence of a domestic cost advantage. The protectionist bias in the mechanism of decision-making increases the probability for affirmative findings and higher duties in the case of cost disadvantages.
This applies especially in cases where the Commission uses production costs to determine the normal value. The expected sign of the respective coefficient is negative in the A/R-test.
Product differentiation within one application is approximated by the number of NIMEXE-positions per case (NOPROD). Finger et al. (1982) suggest that the coefficient of NOPROD should be negative in an A/R test, since the pricing concept is relatively precise and more suitable for individual products than large aggregates.
We hypothesize that NOPROD has a significant effect in the INSTR-test. As negotiation costs increase with the number of products covered by an undertaking, we Claim that collusion behavior is less probable for cases covering a large number of products resulting in an expected positive sign for the coefficient of NOPROD.
The administrative iniurv determination is illustrated by changes in market share, capacity utilization, and profits.
These variables are less "political" than LAYOFF, but they do not constitute strict Standards and leave significant discretion as to causality and damage (see section III). it to be more interested in duties than in undertakings. This argument may explain the unexpected positive coefficient of STD.
Monopolistic firms from state-trading countries prove to obtain more undertakings than other firms showing that foreign lobbyists are interested in undertakings rather than duties.
The ambiguity of our results may stem from the relevance of both the collusion and the strong instrument hypothesis.
-19 -Furthermore, firm specific characteristics, e.g. accused foreign firms being the subsidiary of or in joint venture with an EC firm, may also determine the choice of Instrument.
The 
V. Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the prominent role of anti dumping laws as an instrument of endogenous trade policy in the EC. In contrast with the US where dumping is subject to technical determination, the EC application of antidumping laws reflects political discretion and influence.
-21 -Notes:
1 Norall (1986) , Finger and Nogues (1987) , and Tharakan (1988) have noted the flexible nature of the EC antidumping investigations.
2 See Schuknecht 1990 for an analysis of national protectionism in the EC.
3 A short overview of the US AD policy is provided by Hillman (1989, Ch.ll) and Finger (1989) . Vermulst (1987) compares the US and the EC practice from a legal perspective; Schuknecht and Ursprung (1990) provide a detailed institutional study.
4 These are the most important criteria. The other conditions for an affirmative decision, the dumping of a "like product" by a domestic firm that causes injury, have not played an important role in both the US and the EC.
5 Several studies have identified a protectionist bias in the antidumping rules (Norall, 1986 , Palmeter, 1988 , Tharakan, 1988 , Messerlin, 1989 . The bias increases the expected level of protection; however, it does not decide on political or technical determination. 6 Finger, Hall, and Nelson (1982) therefore argue that US-AD can be viewed as "low track" protection, although they show that some political influence on the ITC's injury decision exists.
Their choice of variables indicating political determination of injury decisions is somewhat incomplete. The variables applied -22for the technical test are different to those that ITC officials are supposed to take into consideration. 7 A detailed overview over the EC Antidumping law is provided by Bael and Bellis (1985) , Beseler and Williams (1986), Vermulst (1987) , Bierwagen and Hailbronner (1988) , Grolig and Bogaert (1987) and Bierwagen (1989) .
8 Data on the preselection is not published, the rate of rejection at this stage is supposedly larger than 50%. This practice suggests the Intention to disguise preselection criteria. However, the adverse affect on imports of an AD threat is prevented at this stage to the advantage of exporters.
9 These criteria have been applied voluntarily since 1980 which should reduce the impact of this reform.
10 We suppose that decisions at the preselection stage are under strict political scrutiny. However, the Information necessary for an empirical analysis was not available.
11 Cf. Hillman, 1990 . Undertakings transfer part of the protectionist rents to foreigners dissipating their resistance.
They must be agreed on by the parties involved. Finger, et al. (1982) .
16 The exact number of firms cannot be reconstructed from the EC AD reports for most cases.
17 Messerlin (1989) mentions an optimal number of lobbying firms which could not be confirmed for our data set. 
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